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From Door to Desk(top):  
The Portal-to-Portal Act in the Digital Age 
Colin Pajda* 
INTRODUCTION: THE COMPUTER AS WORKPLACE 
 
In 1996, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook gave an address to law students at 
the University of Chicago entitled Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
which he eventually adapted into an article.1 In this article, Judge 
Easterbrook argues that, rather than develop a new field of law to handle 
cyberspace-based intellectual property claims, judges and attorneys should 
instead focus on adapting the existing structures of intellectual property 
law to problems arising from the digital distribution of materials via 
networks.2 While Judge Easterbrook’s concerns were with intellectual 
property law specifically, his proposal may apply to other areas of the law 
that are struggling to find resolutions to digital-based claims. Wage and 
hour litigation is one of these areas easily adaptable to Judge 
Easterbrook’s conclusions. 
Over the last decade, wage and hour suits by call center employees 
have greatly increased.3 These employees claim that their employers have 
 
*       J.D. (2018) Washington University School of Law. 
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 UNIV. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 
207. The analogy of “The Law of the Horse,” Easterbrook explains, began with former University of 
Chicago Law Dean Gerhard Casper, who disapproved of courses entitled “Law and . . .” for being 
intellectually deficient. Rather than take a course entitled “Law and Horses,” Casper and Easterbrook 
claim it is “[f]ar better for most students—better, even, for those who plan to go into the horse trade—
to take courses in property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like, adding to the diet of horse 
cases a smattering of transactions in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by putting the law of the 
horse in the context of broader rules about commercial endeavors could one really understand the law 
about horses.” Id. at 208. 
2. Id. at 207-08 (“Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make about new 
technology, are highly likely to be false. This should make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for 
cyberspace. . . . This leads directly to my principal conclusion: Develop a sound law of intellectual 
property, then apply it to computer networks.”). 
3. Manesh K. Rath, Managing Risk Associated with Wage and Hour Class Actions, in 
UNDERSTANDING FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATIONS 53, 57 (2010) ("After [IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005)], we witnessed a rash of class actions filed against employers in 
hospitality, call centers, healthcare, manufacturing, and other industries where set-up and take-down 
time were significant.”). Rath explains this uptick further, saying, “an increase in wage and hour 
collective actions can be attributed to an overall rise in employment litigation generally.” Id. There are 
several reasons that these wage and hour suits have become more attractive to plaintiffs in recent 
years: “Wage and hour suits that can easily be styled as class actions when compared to more fact-
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violated the Fair Labor Standards Act4 (“FLSA”) by not compensating 
them for the time it takes to boot up and shut down their computers before 
and after their work shifts.5 To determine whether this time is 
compensable or not, courts must decide if booting up and shutting down 
are “integral and indispensable” to the principal activity of the employees’ 
employment.6 The integral and indispensable test, which was developed 
by the Supreme Court in Steiner v. Mitchell7 in 1956 and more recently 
clarified in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk8 in 2014, asks whether the 
activity is “an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the 
employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.”9 
 Under the integral and indispensable test, employers defend their 
practices by arguing that booting up before and shutting down after shifts 
are neither integral nor indispensable to employees’ work. They argue that, 
since employers could hypothetically dispense with these processes by not 
requiring password protection on computers or not having employees shut 
down computers at the end of their shifts, these activities do not meet the 
requirements of the integral and indispensable test.10 These factually 
 
specific discrimination and wrongful termination claims; [a] favorable attorneys' fees provision under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); [a] provision in the FLSA that provides for liquidated damages 
in some instances; [w]age and hour claims often involve disputes between employees and management 
as to the basic facts of a claim, such as an employee's job description, making it necessary for many 
cases to go to jury trials. In contrast, other employment law claims can often be solved at a motions 
practice level.” Id. 
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2017). 
5. Pamela A. Reynolds, Employees Are Requesting Pay for ‘Booting Up’ 287 FAIR LAB. 
STANDARDS HANDBOOK FOR STATES, LOC. GOV'T & SCH. NEWSL. 3 (2009) (“There are a number of 
lawsuits pending around the country that argue employers who require hourly employees to boot up or 
shut down their computers off the clock, i.e., prior to the beginning of a work shift or after the end of a 
work shift, without pay are violating the FLSA. These lawsuits often involve employees who work in 
‘call centers,’ meaning the employees' duties involve placing or receiving phone calls to or from 
customers or other users.”). 
6. Lopez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 690 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Activities performed either 
before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line, are compensable . . . if those 
activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen 
are employed and are not specifically excluded by 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).”). 
7. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956). 
8. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). 
9. Id. at 517. 
10. See generally Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (holding that mandatory security screenings before and 
after employees’ shifts were not integral and indispensable to the employees’ productive work since 
the employer could have dispensed with the screenings without affecting the performance of the 
employees’ principal activities). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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intensive inquiries necessarily call into question what constitutes 
employees’ “work,” a term defined neither by the FLSA nor the Portal-to-
Portal Act.11 Instead, employers, employees, and judges must rely solely 
on past judicial interpretations when determining the extent of 
compensable “work.” But the majority—if not all—of these interpretations 
rest on assumptions about physical work: pulling a lever on an assembly 
line, filing physical paperwork, and traveling to a workstation.12 What 
these interpretations do not account for is the ever-quickening move from 
physical to digital “work.” Instead, judges must try to force the realities of 
the modern digital workplace—for example, the computer-based call 
centers mentioned above—into the rigid mold of traditional, pre-digital 
employment law. 
The optimal solution to this problem would be the amending and 
rewriting of traditional employment law to incorporate conceptions of both 
physical and digital work as well as their corresponding workplaces. This 
legislative intervention would most likely be exceedingly difficult in the 
current state of our Congress and, in any case, would not be timely enough 
to answer questions currently pending in our courts.  
There is, however, a simpler, intermediary solution to the problem of 
call center wage and hour litigation, which takes into consideration 
distinctions between physical and digital work while avoiding the 
necessity of legislative action: Judge Easterbrook’s solution, noted 
above.13 Instead of trying to develop new employment law for the digital 
workplace—which may be outdated in relatively few years14—the courts 
and the attorneys who inform them should focus on adapting current 
employment law to novel digital claims as they arise. While this 
 
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2017). 
12. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 4 ("The FLSA, which was enacted in 1938 before the era of 
computers, does not offer much guidance. While the Act has been amended a few times, neither the 
amendments nor U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulations specifically address the meaning of 
‘work’ in the high-tech business world. This task has largely been left to the courts. While employers 
are required to compensate their employees for all hours ‘suffered or permitted’ to work, the FLSA 
does not define ‘work.’ But the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that compensable work generally 
includes ‘all the time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty or at a prescribed work place.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
13. Easterbrook, supra text accompanying note 2. 
14. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 210 (“If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-
understood technology such as photocopiers . . . what chance do we have for a technology such as 
computers that is mutating faster than the virus in The Andromeda Strain?”). 
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adaptation is currently being undertaken, there is a nearly ubiquitous 
institutional error that is leading to inconsistent interpretations and 
decisions. That error is the analogizing of the computer to a tool. 
However, the more appropriate analogy for a computer is the workplace. 
Consider the example provided by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.15 
The Portal-to-Portal Act exempts employers for compensating the ingress 
and egress of employees; that is, the “walking, riding, or traveling to and 
from the actual place of performance of the principal activity.”16 While the 
Act imagines physical ingress and egress—the walking of an employee 
from the parking lot to the door to the desk—it also gives courts a method 
of applying physical work laws to digital scenarios. In this analogy, the 
computer is not the tool of the worker, but the workplace itself; booting up 
and shutting down are not tasks, but digital forms of ingress and egress. 
By engaging in this analogy, courts would have a method for applying 
physical work laws to digital work, and therefore, a method for deciding 
compensable time in these cases. 
This analogy would also give the courts a bright line rule for boot-up 
and shutdown time compensability, and employers would, in turn, have 
clear guidelines for what constitutes compensable time in a call center 
setting. Furthermore, since the Portal-to-Portal Act is a default rule, it can 
be contractually circumscribed. With this in mind, unions and employee 
groups—who would know that booting up and shutting down is not 
inherently compensable time under the FLSA—would be motivated to 
bargain for such compensation. This knowledge would encourage the 
parties to determine compensability during the contract stage of 
employment and relieve the courts of unwieldy call center class actions. 
 This Note will first trace the history of determining what constitutes 
compensable “work,” starting with the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, 
and then following their application through the three seminal cases of 
 
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2017). 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (2017) (“[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the failure of such employer to pay an 
employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of 
the following activities of such employee . . . (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual 
place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to 
perform . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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Steiner,17 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,18 and Busk.19 This Note will then analyze 
how these decisions might be applied to the problem of booting up and 
shutting down computers in call centers. This analysis begins by showing 
how the starting of computers can be viewed as non-compensable pre- and 
postliminary activities not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ 
productive work, and then progresses into a discussion of how booting up 
and shutting down a computer can be viewed as a digital extension of 
physical ingress and egress. Finally, this Note will propose that, by 
viewing the booting up and shutting down processes as acts of moving 
between the workplace door and a workstation, courts can bypass the fact 
intensive inquiries regarding what actions are “integral and indispensable” 
to the work of a call center employee. This would provide clear guidelines 
to employers about what time needs to be compensated. Furthermore, 
since the Portal-to-Portal Act is a default rule and can be contractually 
circumscribed, unions and employee groups will be motivated to bargain 
for log-in compensation, knowing that booting up and shutting down time 
is not inherently compensable under the FLSA. 
 
I. HISTORY: DEFINING “WORK” 
 
In 1938 during the Great Depression,20 Congress enacted the FLSA, 
establishing a national minimum wage and requiring overtime 
compensation for every hour of work over forty hours per workweek.21 
 
17. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956). 
18. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). 
19. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). 
20. Harris Pogust & Andrew Sciolla, Making Up for Lost Time, 46 TRIAL 28, 29 (2010). 
(“Congress enacted the FLSA during the Depression in 1938 to protect workers' rights and to aid in the 
interplay between management and laborers.”) (internal citations omitted). 
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. See Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 25 (“As enacted in 1938, the FLSA, required 
employers engaged in the production of goods for commerce to pay their employees a minimum wage 
of ‘not less than 25 cents an hour,’ and prohibited the employment of any person for workweeks in 
excess of 40 hours after the second year following the legislation ‘unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of [40] hours . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he is employed.’”) (internal citations omitted). See also Danuta 
Bembenista Panich & Christopher C. Murray, Back on the Cutting Edge: "Donning-and-Doffing" 
Litigation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 58 FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2011 at 14, 14 (2011) 
("Since its enactment, the FLSA has been subject to several amendments and expansions. But the law's 
two basic requirements for nonexempt employees remain the same: they must be paid a specified 
minimum wage and they must be paid at a time-and-a-half premium rate for all time worked beyond 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although an employer could be held liable for violating these provisions, 
“FLSA did not define ‘work’ or ‘workweek,’ and [the Supreme Court] 
interpreted those terms broadly.”22 “Work” came to be defined as 
“physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or 
required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer and his business,”23 while “workweek” was 
interpreted to “includ[e] all time during which an employee is necessarily 
required to be on the employer's premises, on duty or at a prescribed 
workplace.”24 These early decisions, which included compensation for 
time spent traveling to underground work areas25 and walking to work 
benches,26 “provoked a flood of litigation.”27 
In response to this litigation and the large sums being awarded to 
plaintiff workers,28 Congress found that the FLSA had “been interpreted 
judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and 
contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly 
unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, 
upon employers.”29 Congress worried that, under this interpretation, “the 
 
40 hours in a workweek."). 
22. Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 516. 
23. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (“[W]e 
cannot assume that Congress here was referring to work or employment other than as those words are 
commonly used—as meaning physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or 
required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his 
business.”). 
24. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946) (holding that the time 
spent walking from a time clock to the production floor and the time spent conducting the preliminary 
activity of donning non-protective gear was compensable). 
25. Tennessee Coal, 321 U.S. at 598. 
26. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 691-92. 
27. Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 516 (“In the six months following this Court's decision in Anderson, 
unions and employees filed more than 1,500 lawsuits under the FLSA.”). 
28. Id. (“These suits sought nearly $6 billion in back pay and liquidated damages for various 
preshift and postshift activities.”). 
29. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a)(2017). See also Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 26 (“Based on findings that judicial 
interpretations of the FLSA had superseded ‘long-established customs, practices, and contracts 
between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount 
and retroactive in operation,’[Congress] responded with two statutory remedies, the first relating to 
‘existing claims,’ and the second to ‘future claims.’ Both remedies distinguish between working time 
that is compensable pursuant to contract or custom and practice, on the one hand, and time that was 
found compensable under this Court's expansive reading of the FLSA, on the other. Like the original 
FLSA, however, the Portal-to-Portal Act omits any definition of the term ‘work.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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payment of such liabilities would bring about financial ruin of many 
employers” and employees would “receive windfall payments . . . for 
activities performed by them without any expectation of reward beyond 
that included in their agreed rates of pay.”30 Therefore, Congress swiftly 
passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, exempting employers from compensating 
employees for two sets of activities: 
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity or activities which such 
employee is employed to perform, and (2) activities which are 
preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities, 
which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at 
which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any 
particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or 
activities.31 
With the Portal-to-Portal Act, Congress “distinguishe[d] between 
activities that are essentially part of the ingress and egress process and 
those that constitute the actual ‘work of consequence performed for an 
employer.’”32 These provisions did not, however, mandate that other time 
must be compensable. But, “[t]wo years later, Congress added Section 
203(o) to the FLSA to preserve the ability of employers and unions to 
bargain with respect to the compensability of time spent ‘changing clothes 
or washing at the beginning or end of each workday.’”33 Furthermore, the 
Portal-to-Portal Act did not supply a definition for “work” absent from the 
FLSA, nor did it attempt to change the Court’s interpretation of “work.”34 
Shortly after Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Department 
of Labor (“DOL”) promulgated regulations defining “workday” as “the 
 
30. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a)-(b). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).  
32. Franczek Radelet, Unanimous Supreme Court Rules Employer Need Not Pay for Worker 
Security Screenings: Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, WAGE & HOUR INSIGHTS (Dec. 9, 
2014), http://www.wagehourinsights.com/2014/12/unanimous-supreme-court-rules-employer-need-
not-pay-for-worker-security-screenings-integrity-staffin/. 
33. Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Defining the Workday in the Modern Economy, 29 
No. 4 LAB. & EMP. L. 3, 2 (2012). 
34. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 28 (“[T]he Portal-to-Portal Act does not purport to change this Court's 
earlier descriptions of the terms ‘work’ and ‘workweek,’ or to define the term ‘workday.’”). 
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period from whistle to whistle.”35 These regulations also state that 
employees must be compensated for “[p]eriods of time between the 
commencement of the employee’s first principal activity and the 
completion of his last principal activity on any workday. . . .”36 Although 
these regulations have not been amended since they were drafted in 1947, 
the DOL has periodically issued other guidance for interpreting the Portal-
to-Portal Act.37 Most recently issued in 2010, Interpretation No. 2010-2 
dealt with the ability to bargain with respect to time spent changing 
clothes before and after an employee’s shift, stating “even where ‘clothes 
changing’ is excluded from compensable time by operation of Section 
203(o) and a collective bargaining agreement, it may be a ‘principal 
activity’ that triggers the start of the workday.”38 
With the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, “employers have 
not been obligated to pay their employees for time spent traveling to and 
from the place where they perform their primary work functions or for any 
activity employees perform before or after their primary duties.”39 The 
Court first had the opportunity to address the Portal-to-Portal Act in 
Steiner v. Mitchell.40 In Steiner, the Court considered whether employees 
of a battery factory should be compensated for the time it took to don and 
doff required protective gear at the beginning and end of their work shift. 
In addressing this question, the Court held that “activities performed either 
before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line, are 
compensable under the portal-to-portal provisions of the [FLSA] if those 
 
35. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a)(2011). See also Mark A. Shank & Bridget A. Blinn, What Is Work? 
FLSA Pitfalls at the Beginning and End of the Workday, 16 No. 2 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. 
GUIDANCE ART 3 (“The U.S. Department of Labor then adopted regulations to help clarify what 
counts as time worked. Essentially, activities that are ‘primarily for the benefit of the employer’ and 
that are ‘suffered or permitted by an employer’ constitute compensable work time. In the litigation 
context, courts apply a general rule that an employer is liable for off-the-clock work if the employer 
knew or should have known that the employee was working.”). 
36. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a). 
37. Alfred, supra note 33, at 2. 
38. Alfred, supra note 33, at 2-3. 
39. Pogust, supra note 20, at 31. 
40. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 248 (1956) (holding compensable “time incident to 
changing clothes at the beginning of the shift and showering at the end, where they must make 
extensive use of dangerously caustic and toxic materials, and are compelled by circumstances, 
including vital considerations of health and hygiene, to change clothes and to shower in facilities 
which state law requires their employers to provide . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities 
for which covered workmen are employed.”41 The Court concluded that 
donning and doffing were “integral and indispensable” to the “principal 
activities” of the employees, and were therefore compensable under the 
FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act.42 In so finding, the Court held that 
“activities ‘integral and indispensable’ to a principal activity are 
themselves principal activities and are not excludable from work time 
under the Portal-to-Portal Act.”43 
After Steiner, “the application and understanding of ‘integral and 
indispensable part of the principal activities’ was inconsistent, at least until 
2005,”44 when the Court decided another donning and doffing case, 
Alvarez.45 In Alvarez, the Court employed a three-part donning and doffing 
test to determine whether preliminary and postliminary activities are 
compensable: “Does the activity constitute ‘work’? Is the activity an 
‘integral and indispensable duty’ of the job? Is the activity so insignificant 
in scope and duration as to be excluded from compensability as de 
minimis?”46 Using this test, the Court held that IBP’s meat and poultry 
processing employees must be compensated “for time spent walking 
between the place where they don and doff personal protective equipment 
and the place where they actually process the meat or poultry.”47 The 
Court reasoned that, since donning and doffing protective gear is integral 
and indispensable to the employees’ principal activities, the time spent 
walking between the changing area and the workstations is also integral 
and indispensable.48 However, the Court also held that the waiting time 
 
41. Id. at 256. 
42. Id. at 249. See also Leah Avey, Walk to the Line, Compensable Time: Cash in the Pockets of 
Employees, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 135, 147 (2007) (noting that the Steiner Court relied on the 
legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act for its interpretation of the “integral and indispensable” 
test, quoting in relevant part “that those activities which are so closely related and are an integral part 
of the principal activity, indispensable to its performance, must be included in the concept of principal 
activity.”). 
43. Alfred, supra note 33, at 2. 
44. Pogust, supra note 20, at 28. 
45. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (holding that time spent walking between changing 
and production areas is compensable under the FLSA, but that time spent waiting to receive personal 
protective equipment at the beginning of a work shift is not compensable). 
46. Pogust, supra note 20, at 33. 
47. Id. 
48. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 32, 37 (“IBP [did] not challenge the holding below that, in light of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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before the employees don their first piece of protective gear is not 
compensable since it is the donning which marks the beginning of the 
continuous workday.49 
The “integral and indispensable” test begun in Steiner and developed in 
Alvarez was more recently clarified in Busk.50 In October 2010, an 
employee in one of Amazon’s warehouses brought a class action against 
Integrity Staffing Solutions (“Integrity”), alleging violations of the FLSA 
and Nevada state law.51 Busk and the other warehouse employees claimed 
that they were not compensated for time spent waiting in line for 
mandatory security screenings at the end of their shifts. The district court 
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, holding “that these 
screenings were not integral and indispensable but instead fell into a 
noncompensable category of postliminary activities.”52 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s ruling, reasoning that an employer has to 
compensate employees for postliminary activities “if those postshift 
activities are necessary to the principal work performed and done for the 
benefit of the employer.”53 The defendants then appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling. The Court 
began by clarifying the “integral and indispensable” test, explaining that 
an activity is “integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an 
employee is employed to perform if it is an intrinsic element of those 
 
Steiner, the donning and doffing of unique protective gear are ‘principal activities’ under § 4 of the 
Port-to-Portal Act.”). 
49. Id. at 42. 
50. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014) (No. 13-433), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/13-433_o758.pdf; Oral 
Argument, Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014) (No. 13-433), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2014/13-433. 
51. Federal Law Bars Kentucky State Wage Law Claims Against Amazon, Judge Says, 18 EMP. 
PRAC. LIABILITY VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS, no. 7, 2016, at 19. See Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 515 ("The 
employer in this case required its employees, warehouse workers who retrieved inventory and 
packaged it for shipment, to undergo an antitheft security screening before leaving the warehouse each 
day. The question presented is whether the employees' time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing 
those security screenings is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 
U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as amended by the Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947, § 251 et seq.”). 
52. Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 516. 
53. Id. (“The Court of Appeals asserted that postshift activities that would ordinarily be 
classified as noncompensable postliminary activities are nevertheless compensable as integral and 
indispensable to an employee's principal activities if those postshift activities are necessary to the 
principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to 
perform his principal activities.”54 Applying the test to the facts of this 
case, the Court found that the required security screenings were non-
compensable postliminary activities for two reasons. First, the screenings 
could not be considered principal activities because “Integrity Staffing did 
not employ its workers to undergo security screenings, but to retrieve 
products from warehouse shelves and package those products for shipment 
to Amazon customers.”55 Second, the screenings could not be considered 
integral and indispensable to a principal activity because they were not “an 
intrinsic element of those activities [or] one with which the employee 
cannot dispense if he is to perform those activities.”56 Since Integrity could 
have dispensed with the screenings, the Court reasoned that it was not 
intrinsic to the principal activity of the warehouse workers.57 Along with 
clarifying the test, the Court’s decision in Busk also made “clear that the 
fact that an employer requires a particular activity does not make that 
activity integral and indispensable and, thus, compensable.”58 Instead, the 
activity must be an “intrinsic element” of the principal activity.59 The 
Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ assertions that Integrity could have 
lessened the time spent waiting in security lines, ruling that “[t]he fact that 
an employer could reduce the time spent on any preliminary or 
postliminary activity does not change the nature of the activity or its 
relationship to the principal activities that a worker is employed to 
perform.”60 
 
54. Id. at 517. 
55. Id. at 518. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (“The screenings were not an intrinsic element of retrieving products from warehouse 
shelves or packaging them for shipment. And Integrity Staffing could have eliminated the screenings 
altogether without impairing the employees' ability to complete their work.”). 
58. Patrick Bannon, Rebecca DeGroff, Noah Finkel & Richard Alfred, An “Integral and 
Indispensable” Supreme Court Win For Employers Regarding What Counts As Time Worked Under 
the FLSA, WAGE & HOUR LITIG. BLOG (December 9, 2014), http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/off-
the-clock-issues/an-intrinsic-supreme-court-win-for-employers-regarding-what-counts-as-time-
worked-under-the-flsa/. 
59. Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 517. 
60. Jon D. Bible, Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk: Employee Time in Security 
Screenings Not Compensable Work under FLSA, BUS. L. TODAY (March 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/03/keeping_current_bible.html. Although outside of 
the scope of this Note, see Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 593-94 (2d Cir. 2007) for a 
discussion of how required security processes fall under the Portal-to-Portal Act’s ingress and egress 
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After Busk, courts will have to apply the “intrinsic element” test to 
other “integral and indispensable” contexts including “claims for 
compensation for computer ‘boot up’ time in call center environments.”61 
While there is a history of donning and doffing cases that goes back as far 
as the Portal-to-Portal Act, “[m]ost of the cases involving the 
compensability of post-boot-up, pre-clock-in time and the end-of-the-day 
corollary have yet to reach a decision on the merits,”62 and are either 
settled or ongoing.63 
 
exemptions: “The activities required to enter and exit Indian Point—from waiting in line at the vehicle 
entrance through the final card-swipe and handprint analysis—are necessary in the sense that they are 
required and serve essential purposes of security; but they are not integral to principal work activities. 
These security-related activities are modern paradigms of the preliminary and postliminary activities 
described in the Portal–to–Portal Act, in particular, travel time. . . . Plaintiffs argue that the Portal–to–
Portal Act was enacted when the time-consuming security measures at issue may not have been 
envisioned, and there is some force to the observation that security measures at sensitive facilities (and 
elsewhere) are becoming increasingly invasive, layered and time-consuming. But the text of the statute 
does not depend on the purpose of any preliminaries, or how much time such preliminaries may 
consume. Travel time was held to be ‘normal’ (and therefore outside the FLSA) in Kavanagh v. Grand 
Union Co., Inc., even though the plaintiff (who performed mechanical services in defendant's 
supermarkets) commuted five to nine hours a day depending on the supermarkets to which he was 
dispatched. Normal travel time ‘does not represent an objective standard of how far most workers 
commute or how far they may reasonably be expected to commute. Instead, it represents a subjective 
standard, defined by what is usual within the confines of a particular employment relationship.’ By the 
same token, security measures that are rigorous and that lengthen the trip to the job-site do not thereby 
become principal activities of the employment.” (internal citations omitted). 
61. Patrick Bannon, Rebecca DeGroff, Noah Finkel & Richard Alfred, supra note 58 (“The 
‘intrinsic element’ test should be applied by lower courts to many other contexts, including donning 
and doffing claims and claims for compensation for computer ‘boot up’ time in call center 
environments.”). 
62. Log-in and Log-off Time: You May Have to Pay Workers for Booting Up, N.J. EMP. L. 
LETTER (May 22, 2015), http://compensation.blr.com/Compensation-news/Compensation/ 
Compensation-Administration/Log-in-and-log-off-time/ (“The courts that have ruled on 
compensability have come down both ways . . . . For example, in Waine-Golston v. Time Warner 
Entertainment-Advance/New House Partnership, decided in 2013, . . . [t]he U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California held that the logging in and off time was de minimis (i.e., minimal) and 
therefore noncompensable.”). 
63. See e.g., Burch v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(plaintiffs “required to log into their computers and several software applications” before shift); Fry v. 
Accent Mktg. Servs., L.L.C., No. 4:13CV59 CDP, 2013 WL 2403669, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 31, 2013) 
(plaintiffs required to start computers, log in, and bring up programs before shift) (settled); Pegues v. 
CareCentrix, Inc., No. 12-2484-CM, 2013 WL 1896994, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 2013) (plaintiffs 
“required to complete a number of critical tasks before they could clock in via defendant's time-
tracking software”) (ongoing); and Davenport v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, No. 4:12CV0007 AGF, 
2015 WL 1286372, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2015) (alleging breach of the FLSA by “failing to pay 
[employees] for the time it took them to access computer applications when beginning to work and to 
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Furthermore, discovery for these cases can be especially time-intensive 
since the claims are frequently brought as collective actions under the 
FLSA.64 Employers often try to settle these suits early, not only because of 
the cost associated with prolonged discovery and motion practice, but also 
due to the possibility of large jury awards should the employer be found at 
fault at trial.65 Due to the widespread use of customer service call centers 
in large corporations and the variance in boot up times, courts must first 
decide whether large numbers of plaintiffs may sue in an FLSA collective 
action even when boot up times vary substantially.66 
 
II. ANALYSIS: THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO PRE/POSTLIMINARY 
ANALYSIS 
 
 Since the integral and indispensable cases have built on—rather than 
overturned—each other, traditional analysis follows the evolution of the 
test from Steiner’s “principal activities”67 to Alvarez’s 3-part test68 to 
 
close down computer applications at the end of work”) (class decertified March 2017). 
64. Jill S. Kirila, Defense Strategies in Hybrid Wage and Hour Class Action Litigation, in 
STRATEGIES FOR EMP. CLASS & COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 47, 52 (2012) ("Employees with claims under 
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) cannot bring a Rule 23 class action, but may instead join in a collective, opt-
in action. Specifically, the FLSA provides that, in pertinent part, ‘[a]n action to recover the liability 
prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and on 
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party 
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such 
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.’ Under Section 216(b), similarly situated 
employees must opt into a collective action, and no employee is bound by the judgment unless the 
employee opts in . . . Most district courts typically apply a two-step certification procedure to FLSA 
collective actions, which includes conditional class certification, and possible later decertification.") 
(internal citations omitted). See also id. at 49 (“There are several reasons for the exponential and 
continued increase in wage and hour class and collective actions, including the potential for large 
settlements, and the relative ease of litigation from a plaintiff's perspective. The plaintiff must meet 
relatively low standards to conditionally certify a collective action, and a proliferation of ‘copycat 
suits’ has been targeting specific companies or industries.”). 
65. See generally Rath, supra note 3 for a discussion of the difficulties in settling wage and hour 
collective actions. Id. at 55 (“Damages can be substantial in wage and hour collective action cases. In 
one notable example, Braun v. Wal-Mart, No. 19-CO-01-9790, slip op. at 1-2, 6-7 (Minn. Dakota 
County, June 30, 2008) . . . [t]he jury awarded $140 million in damages plus an additional $45 million 
in attorneys' fees.”). 
66. Log-in and Log-off Time, supra note 62 (“The courts are still wrestling with whether affected 
employees can sue as a class, particularly because the amount of time it takes to boot up and shut 
down or log in and log off can vary between individuals.”). 
67. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
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Busk’s “intrinsic element.”69 Engaging in this traditional integral and 
indispensable analysis to determine compensability of boot-up and 
shutdown times in the call center context generally leads to the conclusion 
that boot-up and shutdown time should not be compensable. This, 
however, is not a clear-cut conclusion. 
 Beginning with Steiner, “activities performed either before or after the 
regular work shift . . . are compensable . . . if those activities are an 
integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered 
workmen are employed.”70 In the context of call centers, this analysis 
becomes: Are the pre- and postliminary activities of booting up and 
shutting down integral and indispensable to the employees’ principal 
activity of answering and managing service calls? Based on Steiner’s 
finding that donning and doffing protective gear for battery factory 
workers were integral and indispensable, it would seem that booting up 
and shutting down would be similarly considered compensable. Just as the 
Steiner workers could not begin their principal activity—manufacturing 
batteries—without donning protective gear, neither can call center 
employees begin answering and managing calls without first booting up 
their computers and pulling up the call and service applications. Therefore, 
booting up, at least, would seem integral and indispensable to call center 
workers, and therefore, under Steiner’s holding, a principal activity itself.71 
 However, employing Busk’s “intrinsic element” standard, which only 
sought to clarify the integral and indispensable test, just because 
something is required does not make it integral and indispensable. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit for holding that pre- and 
postliminary activities are compensable if they are “necessary to the 
principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer.”72 The 
Court then clarified the test, holding that an activity is integral and 
indispensable only “if it is an intrinsic element of those [principal] 
activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to 
perform his principal activities.”73 The Court found that required security 
 
68. Pogust, supra note 20, at 28. 
69. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517 (2014). 
70. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. 
71. Alfred, supra note 33. 
72. Busk, 135 S. Ct. at 516. 
73. Id. at 517. 
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screenings were non-compensable pre- and postliminary activities because 
1) “Integrity Staffing did not employ its workers to undergo security 
screenings,”74 and 2) the screenings were not an intrinsic element of the 
principal activity of retrieving items from warehouse shelves because 
Integrity could have dispensed with the screenings.75 
Similarly, in the call center context, call center operators do not hire 
their employees to boot up and shut down computers, but to take and 
manage calls. Therefore, these activities are not in themselves principal 
activities. And although booting up and shutting down may seem like 
indispensable activities, that is not the case. Just as Integrity could have 
dispensed with the screenings at the expense of warehouse security, call 
center operators could dispense with booting up and shutting down by 
telling employees to leave the computers on and logged-in at the end of 
their shifts at the expense of computer security and operation quality. But 
the operators need not do this to argue that these activities are dispensable 
since “the fact that an employer requires a particular activity does not 
make that activity integral and indispensable and, thus, compensable.”76 
Finally, the application of Alvarez’s three-part test suggests that 
booting up and shutting down are compensable pre- and postliminary 
activities under traditional conceptions of “work.” Under this test, the 
Court must decide: “Does the activity constitute ‘work’? Is the activity an 
‘integral and indispensable duty’ of the job? Is the activity so insignificant 
in scope and duration as to be excluded from compensability as de 
minimis?”77 In Alvarez, the Court held that donning and doffing protective 
equipment and walking from the equipment room to the processing 
stations were compensable78, but that the time waiting to don and doff gear 
was not compensable.79 In the call center context, courts begin by asking 
whether booting up and shutting down constitute “work.” Under 
traditional conceptions that view the computer as a single, unified tool, the 
answer would seem to be “yes.” However, by taking into account the 
realities of the modern, digital workplace, the computer is seen as a self-
 
74. Id. at 518. 
75. Id. 
76. Patrick Bannon, Rebecca DeGroff, Noah Finkel & Richard Alfred, supra note 58. 
77. Pogust, supra note 20, at 33. 
78. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005). 
79. Id. at 42. 
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contained workplace, where each discrete function of the computer 
(booting up, logging in, starting applications, using applications, etc.) is an 
independent event. Under this framework, pressing the power button on a 
computer and entering log-in credentials is seen, not as the first act of 
“work,” but as the turn of a doorknob and the swiping of an employee 
badge. And, based on the analysis above, booting up and shutting down 
are not “integral and indispensable dut[ies] of the job,” but dispensable 
processes used to enhance security and efficiency, and not necessary in 
themselves. Finally, under all but the most extreme cases, the booting up 
and shutting down of a computer, the primary function of which is call 
tracking and loading management applications, will involve de minimis 
periods of time. 
 
III. PROPOSAL: A NEW ANALOGY FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
As seen in the above analysis, applying the traditional integral and 
indispensable test to the problems of the digital workplace can be 
inconsistent and, at times, unsatisfactory. And in each case, parties to 
boot-up litigation must start fresh, asking under their particular facts: Does 
compensable time run from booting up? from logging in? or from opening 
a timekeeping application? What constitutes de minimis boot-up and 
shutdown time and does it differ based on brand of computer? operating 
system? or number of running applications? 
There is, however, a simpler and more consistent way to adapt 
traditional work laws to the changing realities of the digital workplace: by 
analogizing the computer, not to a tool, but to a workplace. If we view the 
computer as a self-contained workplace and not simply as a single tool, it 
becomes easier to apply existing standards to digital work with more 
consistency. 
Take, for example, the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions for ingress 
and egress. When the computer is considered as a single tool, these 
exemptions have no application. But when the computer is viewed as a 
workplace, the Portal-to-Portal Act’s application becomes clear: booting 
up and shutting down are not the first and last acts of “work,” they are 
forms of travel—digital travel—which are exempted from compensability 
under the Portal-to-Portal Act. Subsection (a)(1) of the Act exempts 
“walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/16
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of the principal activity” from compensable time.80 Driving to work, 
walking from the parking lot to the office door, and walking from the door 
to the desk are all forms of travel traditionally exempt under this 
subsection. By recognizing that “place of actual performance” of the 
principal activity of the employee’s work is increasingly no longer the 
desk, but the desktop, it is clear that boot-up, log-in, and shutdown time 
are simply other forms of travel that may also be exempt. Under this new 
model, digital activities are simply extensions of exempted actions: 
booting up is the employee traveling to the workplace, logging in is the 
trip from the door to the desk, and shutting down at the end of the day is 
simply leaving the place of work. 
This reading of the Portal-to-Portal Act would give a clear and 
consistent rule for boot-up and shutdown litigation. Parties to such 
litigation would no longer have to argue whether boot-up and shutdown 
times are or are not non-compensable pre- and postliminary activities 
under subsection (a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, but would know from 
the beginning that they are forms of travel and directly excluded by (a)(1). 
While legislative recognition in the form of an amendment to the Portal-
to-Portal Act or to the FLSA itself would be the most efficient application 
of this reading,81 an intermediary step would be for courts—and the 
attorneys who inform them—to begin adapting conceptions of digital work 
and travel into their decisions regarding boot-up and shutdown litigation. 
Furthermore, the implications of a bright line rule about the 
compensability of boot-up/shutdown time are three-fold: 1) it would 
decrease the amount of burdensome wage and hour collective actions;82 2) 
it would encourage employees to bargain or demand that boot-up and 
 
80. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). 
81. Christine D. Higgins, Can I Get Paid for That?: The Compensability of Commuting Time 
Post-IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), 86 NEB. L. REV. 208, 227 (2007) ("The best solution 
appears to be Congressional [sic] legislation . . . Congress should amend the Portal-to-Portal Act to 
include a section discussing commuting time which operates in accordance with the long-standing 
precedents and regulations."). 
82. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 4 ("Even though the issue has not been squarely decided by the 
courts, employers should evaluate their policies for defining work time that involves booting up. 
Employers can avoid potential litigation by requiring employees boot up only after the start of their 
work shift. Otherwise, employers must determine whether ‘booting up’ a computer is essential for the 
employees' principal activities. Whether that time is compensable working time under the FLSA is 
highly fact dependent and will vary depending on the circumstances."). 
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shutdown time be compensable under their employment agreements; and 
3) it would begin a process by which conceptions of digital work could be 
integrated into other areas of employment law, such as digital employee 
privacy. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE NEXT STEP IN ADAPTING WORK LAWS TO DIGITAL 
WORKPLACES 
 
 Boot-up and shutdown litigation is quickly becoming one of the 
primary wage and hour focuses of employees and plaintiffs’ attorneys, and 
call centers are a common arena for this litigation. Applying the integral 
and indispensable test for determining whether these pre- and postliminary 
activities are compensable is difficult and inconsistent. The reason for 
these difficulties and inconsistencies is that this analysis attempts to force 
new problems of the modern digital workplace into the frameworks 
created under the assumptions of the traditional physical workplace.  
It is clear that we need a new legal definition of “work”; one that 
recognizes and engages with the realities of the digital workplace. But to 
incorporate conceptions of digital work into our current work law, we do 
not need to start fresh from nothing. To the contrary, the easiest way to 
adapt traditional work laws to the growing number of digital workplaces is 
to map digital work onto existent paradigms developed for physical 
workplaces. 
Relying on traditional models, our tendency is to think of the computer 
as a single tool—the lever of the idealized assembly line. However, if we 
instead choose to accept that “the actual place of performance of the 
principal activity”83 in the modern workplace is no longer the physical 
desk but the digital desktop, then analysis becomes more straightforward. 
Booting up and shutting down become the Portal-to-Portal Act’s ingress 
and egress, which are non-compensable; opening applications becomes a 
form of donning and doffing, which has generally been held to be 
compensable; and checking personal email or web-browsing—when 
permitted—becomes a break with the Internet browser becoming the 
breakroom, the compensability of which would be subject to employer 
 
83. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (2017). 
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policy. These analogies accept that computers are not just tools which 
employees use to complete work, but are themselves self-contained 
workplaces with their own forms of ingress, egress, and work. 
 Engagement in this form of analogy would give courts the ability to 
adapt traditional employment laws to emerging digital problems. By using 
the more accurate analogy of computer-to-workplace rather than 
computer-to-tool, courts should be able to reach consistent decisions even 
as workplace technology continues to advance. Ideally, this analogy would 
also preclude the need for legislative reworking of traditional employment 
laws to incorporate digital concepts or, to the consternation of Judge 
Easterbrook, the need to develop a discrete area of the law for digital 
employment issues. 
 However, there would be advantages to legislative intercession, 
especially if we are concerned by the outcome of any of the suggested 
analogies. For example, Congress may choose to amend the Portal-to-
Portal Act to specifically exclude computer boot-up and shutdown time 
from its compensability exemptions in order to require the employee to be 
compensated for that time. Should the legislature choose to begin 
amending employment law in an attempt to reflect digital workspaces, my 
proposal stands and retains its importance. Just as I urge the courts to 
move from considering the computer as a tool, so should the legislature 
adopt my analogy of the computer as workplace. We need to update the 
way we think about computers in the workplace, especially at a time when 
computers are increasingly becoming the workplace itself.   
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